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Behold
S e r e n e l l a  I o v i n o
Behold moves us out from where we stand. Closed in the solitude of  self- contemplation, the I is thumped by a call— behold— that smashes 
its self- sufficient silence, a silence that concentrates all presence in the 
close proximity of the present or in the apparent distance of things. 
Behold forces us to look elsewhere— or just to swerve our mind beyond 
what seemed familiar, and conceals instead landscapes unseen. Because 
behold is a call that draws the eye/I to something that has always already 
been there— unheeded, undetected, or unrecognized— or to something 
that there will be, in a time that will come, and, once it will be here, it will 
be impossible for us to disregard. Many things and beings inhabit these 
landscapes: nonhuman natures, marginal persons, gulfs of injustice, im- 
pure inhuman lives, beauty, the future, the earth, darkness, the countless 
hyperobjects that mark, as some say, the end of the world. Or, what might 
be the greatest hyperobject of all— God.
As I think of behold, my veering verb in this collective passage across 
the natures of nature that this book attempts, echoes of the ways we 
humans have been summoned by the call of the divine come to my liter-
ary memory. Because— even if God, to my earthly ears, more often speaks 
with the endless speeches of this planet where we live and have our 
being— behold traditionally carries in itself that very voice. It is the voice 
of something both present and unattainable, the voice of all the invisible 
mundane enmeshments and— at the same time— of the world’s distance 
from itself. And so, two routes open in front of me. One is the route of 
immanence— the route of a here- and- now full with hidden but luminous 
Cohen-Duckert.indd   312 13/07/2017   10:46:11 PM
 Behold 313
further dimensions. The other is the route of transcendence— the route to 
an elsewhere that might enlighten or blind you, depending on which side 
you stand on while you gaze at it. Both routes carry you away from where 
you are, and both carry you back to where you were. But, in doing so, they 
both trigger a swirl: because, if you really behold what these routes hint 
at, you will be the one who change. You will be veered. Because behold 
calls you to veer from the used paths. Because behold is a veering call.
First Route: Beholding Immanence
Rio de Janeiro, 1963
There is a cockroach crawling out the closet. You slam the door. She is 
smashed. She is dying. Behold. Her eyes are open. These eyes are watching 
you. They want you to behold this crushed body. You see, you witness. This 
crushed body is there, her eyes are asking you to taste her moistness and full-
ness and otherness. This crushed body— her eyes wet and open— is a face. 
The face of the radically other. The face of the one being that is all beings. You 
see, you witness, you behold. This crushed body it is you, too. This seeing 
body you now behold is the face of god.
The Passion according to G.H., by Clarice Lispector, is a book that, once 
it enters your life, there it will stay. Buried as it might seem, it periodi-
cally reemerges, carrying with itself the “difficult pleasure” that, as its 
author understood, was yet a pleasure. Clarice was well aware of this 
complexity as, addressing the novel’s “Potential Readers,” she pointed 
out that she “would be happy if it were read only by people whose out-
look is fully formed. People who know that an approach— to anything 
whatsoever— must . . . traverse even the very opposite of what is being 
approached” (v).1 People, in other words, able to see— and veer. Forming 
one’s outlook— like forming one’s soul— is indeed challenging.2 It means 
to be able to look outside yourself and give a frame to what you see. It 
means to be virtually ready to organize your experience in relation to 
your (inner) I/eye, while at the same time being ready to forget all this 
and “traverse” from the self to its very opposite. And so, you really need 
to be fully prepared when you face a story where the inside and the out-
side of your I/eye impurely merge into one another— a story that says: 
“What I have seen is unorganizable” (60).
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with God.”3 Through the character of G.H.— whose initials might be an 
abbreviation of the Portuguese gênero humano, “humankind”— she com-
pletely shuttered the standpoints of anthropocentric discourse, inviting 
readers to behold what is beyond and beneath the disenchantment of the 
nonhuman and the humanization of God. She knew what this was all 
about. Born in Ukraine in 1920, her family emigrated to Brazil when she 
was two months old. As her biographer reminds us, she “emerged from 
the world of the Eastern European Jews,” a vanishing society whose 
stubborn mysticism and religiousness she brought “into a new world, a 
world in which God was dead.”4 In this world, loaded with the inqui-
etudes of two continents and her personal history of loss, violence, and 
staggering talent, the beautiful Clarice was to become not only a national 
monument but also the catalyzer of a worldwide attention for her capac-
ity to reshape the language, categories, and style of South American liter-
ature. Topics such as maternity (an ancestral, prelinguistic, and material 
motherhood), the ontological revelation of sameness- in- difference, the 
unremitting observation of the personal and apersonal embodiments of 
life, have contributed to fasten her bond with feminist thinkers and with 
philosophy in general.5 Underlying all these themes is Clarice’s tendency 
to swerve the gaze from an alleged human superiority, and to restore the 
connection— almost an eye contact— with a matter/God that permeates 
all forms of being.
Incubating all this, The Passion is a long monologue in which G.H., 
a bourgeois and wealthy professional from Rio de Janeiro, tells the story 
of how— faced with a dying cockroach— she “converted” to the under-
standing “that the world is not human, and that we are not human” 
(61). As in all mystical tales, the plot, evoked in my “lyrical” epigraph, is 
minimal— and yet abyssal. Alone in her penthouse, G.H. is tidying up a 
room previously occupied by her servant. In the closet of this unadorned 
and almost empty space, she discovers a cockroach and, after observing 
it for a while, crushes it. By beholding the insect’s smashed body, she 
realizes that the cockroach itself (or better, herself: G.H. views it as a 
female and an Ur- mother) is life in its primary, “impure” form. And this 
impure matter— a “prehuman divine life” (93– 94) that looks back through 
this broken body— is God. In the final scene, G.H.’s pantheist passion 
is completed as she eats the matter coming out from the roach’s body, 
here again in a ritual of inherent mutuality: “Then, through the door of 
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condemnation, I ate life and was eaten by life. I understood that my king-
dom is of this world” (112). The traditional order of transcendence is thus 
reversed in a revelation of pure immanence, and the dualism of matter 
and spirit is rejected for a mystical Spinozism: an ecological vision of the 
divine based on the intimate, bodily, and prelogical reciprocity of being 
in which “everything looks at everything, everything experiences the 
other” (58).
In this unexpected ontological trial, seeing and beholding play the 
major role. Their meaning, however, is not limited to the visual dimen-
sion: overcoming the realm of reason, they monistically condense all the 
experiences occurring to G.H. as the narrating fragment of a vast body– 
mind continuum. It is by beholding this “crude, raw glory of nature” (58) 
that G.H. progressively overturns the organized discipline of the ego, 
opening the cataracts for a mystical seeing in which everything is “tra-
versed” and becomes its other. G.H in fact “becomes (with) what she 
sees”: “The desire for intimacy is the desire to surrender to immanence, 
to experience continuity with the world, the desire to become- animal, 
to become- flesh. It is through vision that G.H. surrenders . . . and emp-
ties herself from humanity.”6 In an impure narrative– ontological swirl, 
the Jew Clarice Lispector revives the passage of the Exodus (a word that 
means “a way out”) implying that the face of the divine cannot be beheld 
and survived (Exodus 33:20). By beholding the face of God— a God that 
is here and now— G.H. takes her “way out,” veering away from her human 
self and relinquishing to the world. And so, emptied of her humanity, 
she can eventually find herself “face- to- face with the dusty being that 
was looking back” (49) at her. In its immediate, intimate manifestation, 
the roach’s body indeed is a face, a “shapeless face” (47) that touches and 
beckons from the immemorial neutrality of being. Emmanuel Levinas 
has famously suggested that the other’s face— le visage d’autrui— carries 
an endless appellation to recognize the Other in its naked, “absolute ex- 
posure.”7 In The Passion the visage addressing us— a neutral, inexpressive, 
but at the same time naked and absolutely exposed face— is plunged even 
deeper in the ontological abyss of copresence. The kind of reciprocity 
that emerges in this revelation of mutual belonging and unfathomabil- 
ity, in fact, is not accidental but primordial; it is rooted in the womb of 
matter, mater materia. In this ur- material dimension, existence is the 
transitive proximity of all beings that are as they see each other:
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The cockroach . . . was looking at me. I don’t know if it saw me. . . . But if 
its eyes didn’t see me, its existence existed me: in the primary world that I 
had entered, beings exist other beings as a way of seeing one another. . . . 
The cockroach saw me not with its eyes but with its body. (68)
This bodily distributed seeing is a “chiasm,” an “intertwining,” as Maurice 
Merleau- Ponty would say. If we abandon the human- centered categories 
structured around the divide of a seeing I/eye and a visible other, we reach 
a dimension where “there is a reversibility of the seeing and the visible,”8 
a deep and carnal intermingling that marks each being as “enmeshed 
within the visible present and [as] both seeing and seen, touching and 
touched by the world and the things around us.”9 This dimension is in- 
habited by things that see, by worlds that behold each other as their way 
of existing. This side— the Greeks imagined— is the realm where nature/
physis shines in the plenitude of light/phōs, and all creation is nothing 
else but a seeing, a seeing that pierces the darkness and emerges in all 
appearing things. Here phainesthai is the law of being, and coming into 
light— alighting in this world— does not simply happen in front of the 
subject but along with it.10 In this dimension, lateral to the order of reason, 
G.H. sees, beholds, and is one with everything: empires’ cycles, pyramids 
surging and decaying in the appearing desert, turns of elements and ex- 
tinct species, glaciers arising and melting, proteins and protozoa, voices 
of hieroglyphs and magmatic darkness— all this she witnesses and beholds 
through the roach’s body, feeling the horror of knowing that her orga-
nized self depends on the very disorder of being, spiraled with time. Sta-
bility in fact is only an illusion, whereas reality is everything which veers 
and returns our gaze— it is the roach’s cilia, it is moistness and nausea, an 
inferno of matter, madness— it is raw life. But at the same time, G.H.’s 
experience is also the poetic translation of another vision: that all life is 
a dynamic unfurling of forms, a blind, unrelenting movement that, over 
eons, continues to evoke kinships. Because, in Lynn Margulis’s words, 
“all beings alive today are equally evolved. All have survived over three 
thousand million years of evolution from common bacterial ancestors. 
There are no ‘higher’ beings, no ‘lower animals,’ no angels and no gods.”11
If one can behold all this, then one is ready to understand that the 
“deepest life identity” of the human is not simply intertwined with the 
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nonhuman but is one with the in- human, this “estranged interiority” that 
forces the I to change sides and accept the “discomfort of unfamiliar inti-
macy” with the Other.12 This “unfamiliar intimacy” is— biologically as 
well as ontologically— the cypher of the human itself:
I had looked upon the live cockroach and had discovered in it my deep- 
est life identity. . . . Listen, in the presence of the living cockroach, the 
worst discovery was that the world is not human, and that we are not 
human. . . . The inhuman is our better part, is the thing, the thing part of 
people. (49– 50, 61)
The “thing part” inhabiting the human— be it the blindness of evolution, 
the magmatic Ur- mother of forms and bodies, or “God- matter” (61)— at 
once levels and disorganizes everything, undermining all articulation, 
including understanding and language: “The world interdepended with 
me [and] never again shall I understand what I say. . . . Life is itself for 
me, and I don’t understand what I am saying. And, therefore, I adore.” 
(173). “I adore”: which means, standing in awe, I behold. Because behold-
ing is an experience that leaves you at a loss for words— it leaves lan-
guage itself at a loss for words. Here all the intellectual counterforts built 
to ensure our essential “purity” by seceding the human from all the rest 
are nothing else but a way to contain our contact with matter— a matter 
stigmatized as “impure” only because it takes us back to our original 
chaos. In G.H.’s story this very chaos is redeemed by redeeming matter 
itself and by beholding in the roach’s body the divine who dwells in the 
copresence of things: a “dynamically unfolding process of open- ended 
interactivity”13 that is the creation of God- matter. This explains why such 
words as hope or forgiving sound meaningless now: if matter is already a 
manifestation of God, it is not necessary to imagine an elsewhere in which 
the present will be redeemed: “The present is God’s today face. The hor-
ror is that we know that it is right in life that we see God. It is with our 
eyes truly open that we see God” (141).
If salvation has to be sought, it is not “from matter but within it, within 
our delicate, difficult interactivities.”14 In the immanent body of being, 
God is there, in the open, looking back to us with all H* ever- evolving 
creaturely eyes.
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Second Route: Transcend, Behold
Auschwitz, 1943– 44:
From the point of view . . . of substances that you could steal with profit, 
that laboratory was virgin territory. . . . There was gasoline and alcohol, 
banal and inconvenient loot: . . . the offer was high and also the risk, since 
liquids require receptacles. This is the great problem of packaging, which 
every . . . chemist knows: and it was well known to God Almighty, who 
solved it brilliantly . . . with cellular membranes, eggshells, the multiple peel 
of oranges, and our own skins, because after all we too are liquids. Now, 
at that time, there did not exist polyethylene, which would have suited 
me perfectly since it is flexible, light, and splendidly impermeable: but it 
is also a bit too incorruptible, and not by chance God Almighty himself, 
although he is a master of polymerization, abstained from patenting it: 
He does not like incorruptible things.15
All those who know Primo Levi know that the author of If This Is a Man 
was a chemist. Familiar with the elements’ “lyrical drift and continuous 
conjoining,” in a beautiful book titled The Periodic Table (1975) he fol-
lowed them in their “stormy cultural and material intermixes,”16 letting 
them speak and act along with the events and using their laws and swirls 
to shed some light onto one of the darkest times of European history. In 
the tale “Cerium,” Levi contrasted the way humans manipulate chemi-
cals and the way God— traditionally, more farsighted— does. The image 
of “God Almighty” as a “master of polymerization” facing the unwanted 
consequences of polyethylene resonates deeply with our discourse on 
behold. We can picture this God as a chemist who observes all substances 
through a microscope, while at the same time beholding their effects 
in the vast, macroscopic horizon of creation. Provident by definition, 
this Ultimate Senior Chemist— Levi pinpoints— does not simply abstain 
from creating polyethylene, but from patenting it: S/He leaves to humans 
the choice (and responsibility) to do so, just as S/He leaves to them the 
choice (and responsibility) to do all the rest.
As this scene of a divine scientist in a lab suggests, the movement 
inbuilt in the gaze of Levi’s God is transcendent: by considering new ele-
ments, God beholds beyond singularities and individuals, surmounting 
(id est, trans- scending) the here- and- now from a higher point that “bear[s] 
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vision of things to come over the terrestrial yonder.”17 But the gaze of 
ecology is also transcendent: it is so certainly not because it calls us to 
behold an alleged metaphysical truth beyond the deceptiveness of phe-
nomena but because it regards the more- than- human world by hovering 
over its systemic fabric of causes and effects. Surpassing the horizon of 
the present and of unconnected presences, the “transcendent” dimen-
sion of ecology is indeed entrenched in the time- space- matter field in 
which we are all entangled, whether we grasp it or not. This entangle-
ment transcends singularities, it transcends the punctual being of things, 
and creates flows of excess— it overflows, transcending the landscapes 
that might be contained by our gaze. This ecological transcendence is 
to us another veering call; it too says: behold. And maybe also Levi’s 
Almighty God, master of polymerization, wants to tells us this: behold, 
you— you all, and you humans with your patented creations— are in and 
of this excess. Behold this unfurling view that “grounds human beings 
within the continuum of life, and . . . situates the history of their em- 
bodied skills within the unfolding of that continuum.”18 But in order to 
understand the becoming of this excess within the continuum of life, we 
need another way of seeing things, we need a prospect, a dynamic “con-
sideration of something in the future to be gained from viewing it, and 
the action of facing it.”19 This prospect is the standpoint of a moral imag-
ination that would allow us to envisage the scope of our actions, as they 
are combined with the agency of beings, things, and elements. The new 
materialisms and the ethical vistas that this movement has opened have 
said much about these themes. But the path we are moving along now 
takes another tour, leading us back to the roots of environmental ethics.
Here we encounter a philosopher named Hans Jonas. A Jew like Levi 
and Lispector, in the 1970s Jonas helped veer our ethical gaze away from 
the here- and- now and from the enclosures of human- centeredness. Like 
the title of his famous book, his “imperative of responsibility” is a call to 
behold both the future of our actions and the life of the ontologically 
Other, thus transcending the categories of traditional ethical discourse.20 
The difference here is simple: in their classical formulations, ethics of 
virtue or of duty, for example, invite us to mold our acts upon the insight 
of a superior principle, not to behold the world in which these acts are 
to be performed. And these acts are by definition ethically synchronic 
and species- specific: accomplished by human subjects, they immediately 
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reflect on the subject itself. Jonas’s responsibility ethics, instead, asks 
us to act by observing the upshots of our acts from a vaster— more- than- 
human and transtemporal— perspective. This ethical shift is under-
standable if one considers that its historical context is the one in which 
the whole world is irrevocably called to behold the systemic facets— at 
once social, political, and bio- geo- chemical— of the ecological crisis. To 
a philosophical debate struggling to envision new moral horizons, Jonas 
bequeathed the idea of a “commanding solidarity with the rest of the 
animate world” (138– 39) and of a “real future as an open- ended dimen-
sion of our responsibility” (12). To his eyes, the triumph of technē and 
of human destructive power over the biosphere “reveal” (138), like in a 
mystical disclosure, the link between the “critical vulnerability” (6) of 
natural systems and the necessity of new extended duties:
That which had always been the most elementary of the givens . . .— that 
there are [humans], that there is life, that there is a world for both— this 
suddenly stands forth, as if lit up by lightning, in its stark peril through 
human deed. In this very light this responsibility appears. (138– 39)
Unlike those who maintained the impossibility— both ethical and jurid-
ical— of a moral imperative to safeguard natural balances in the face of 
future generations, for Jonas such an imperative is instead a real obliga-
tion and does not require reciprocity. If behold is a veering call, to behold 
the future of our interconnected being- there is a blind behold— a behold 
based not on an act of faith in the future but on acting so as to let the 
future be. In the perspective of responsibility, the future of humankind 
and that of nonhuman nature converge in one single gaze.
Although it would be improper to describe Jonas as an advocate of 
radical anti- anthropocentrism, reading The Imperative of Responsibility 
we see that the compass of his ethics becomes gradually broader. As if 
in crescendo his vision is progressively veered, anthropodiscentered. Mov-
ing beyond the instrumentalism embedded in traditional humanism, he 
explicitly speaks of “nature’s own dignity” (137). The human/nonhuman 
juxtaposition is therefore transcended: seen in this light, the nonhuman 
is a mirror through which the human might discover and behold its most 
authentic face, Jonas maintains. The instrumental destruction of “the 
rest of nature,” in fact, can only produce “the dehumanization of [the 
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human], the atrophy of [its] essence even in the lucky case of biological 
survival” (136): recognizing the dignity of nonhuman natures is not only 
the condition of our own existence but a path toward a richer humani-
zation of the human itself. This idea of ontological porosity and ethical 
mirroring reappears in the way Jonas considers our exploitation of the 
earth and the living. With his gaze turned toward monocultures and in- 
dustrial farming, almost echoing Levi, Jonas asks if this allegedly “human-
ized nature” is still nature. And his response is unambiguous:
The ultimate degradation of feeling organisms, eager to live and endowed 
with sensibility and capability to move, deprived of their habitats, impris-
oned for all of their life, . . . transformed into egg- and meat- producing 
machines, does not have anything in common with nature.21
As this quote suggests, Jonas’s philosophy, including his environmental 
ethics, is a way to see through holocausts. It is hence unsurprising that 
as his gaze, a few years after The Imperative of Responsibility, veers from 
ethics to theology, the Holocaust is the setting of this veering. As Levi 
also knew, in fact, beholding the inhumane necessarily implies a reflec-
tion on God— not only on God’s existence but also on God’s nature. 
This question is the subject of The Concept of God after Auschwitz, a 
lecture held by Jonas in 1984, whose argument is at once simple and ver-
tiginous.22 After Auschwitz, he maintains, everything has to be reviewed 
because Auschwitz calls us to behold: to behold the human world as 
well as the divine. In particular, Auschwitz has shown that the three attri-
butes that Jewish theology assigned to God— “absolute goodness, abso-
lute power, and intelligibility” (9)— are no longer compossible, they do 
not hold together anymore. It is then necessary to sacrifice one of them, 
and Jonas’s choice falls on omnipotence:
The Deus absconditus, the hidden God . . . is a profoundly un- Jewish con-
ception. Our teaching, the Torah, rests on the premise and insists that we 
can understand God, not completely, to be sure, but something of him— of 
his will, intentions, and even nature— because he has told us. . . . But he 
would have to be precisely [unintelligible] if together with being good he 
were conceived as all powerful. After Auschwitz, we can assert with greater 
force than ever before that an omnipotent deity would have to be either 
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not good or . . . totally unintelligible. But if God is to be intelligible in some 
manner and to some extent (and to this we must hold), then his goodness 
must be compatible with the existence of evil, and this it is only if he is not 
all powerful. Only then can we uphold that he is intelligible and good, and 
there is yet evil in the world. (9– 10)
Auschwitz— and all the other Auschwitzes of history (for both humans 
and nonhumans)— expose the existence of a “divine fate bound up with 
the coming- to- be of a world” (12). Following Gerschom Scholem, Jonas 
goes back to a very influential Kabbalistic doctrine, formulated in the 
sixteenth century by the mystic Isaac Luria. According to Luria’s theory 
of Tzimtzum (self- limitation, contraction) in the moment of creation God 
withdraws from the world:
To make room for the world, the En- Sof . . . had to contract himself so that, 
vacated by him, empty space could expand outside of him. . . . Without 
this retreat into himself, there could be no “other” outside God, and only 
his continued holding- himself- in preserves the finite things from losing 
their separate being again into the divine “all in all.” (12)
Being at once infinitely absent and yet categorically existent, God com-
presses H*self in order to allow a magnified expression of the world. 
From the outside of this absolute transcendence, God beholds the world, 
letting the world free to behold God. The freedom of this mutual behold-
ing comes at the price of God’s omnipotence over the creation: “Creation 
was that act of absolute sovereignty with which it consented, for the sake 
of self- determined finitude, to be absolute no more— an act, therefore, 
of divine self- restriction” (11). This has an important consequence: “Hav-
ing given himself whole to the becoming world, God has no more to 
give: it is [hu]man’s now to give to him” (12). From ethics to theology 
and then back to ethics: an ethics of responsibility based on the absolute 
transcendence of a God that beholds us from the external edge of cre-
ation, leaving us free— and bonded— to move within the finitude of these 
limits. This is God, the “master of polymerization” who does not patent 
polyethylene. Indeed, only a horizon defined by an act of “divine self- 
restriction” can enable an ethics of human responsibility— one calling us 
to behold creation and hold to its fragility.
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At the end of his lecture, Jonas declares that we have to contend with 
“Auschwitz rather than the earthquake of Lisbon”— namely, with “delib-
erate evil rather than the inflictions of blind, natural causality” (11). But 
here is the point: if the earthquake that smashed Western Europe in 1755 
was the outcome of “blind, natural causality,” then the causality that trig-
gers catastrophes that interlock human fate with the fate of nonhuman 
natures is not blind— or ought not to be.23 Still, in an epoch that we call 
“Anthropocene” the challenge is just this: how to see the innumerable 
entanglements of human causality and natural agencies, how to hold and 
behold them in space, time, and matter. This visualizing challenge is one 
with the call to embrace the future in our ethical prospect, also because 
we need a farseeing moral imagination to face the almost undetectable 
forms of “slow violence” coming from pollutions and contaminations, 
the hidden aggression that “occurs gradually and out of sight,” whose 
repercussions are played out “across a range of temporal scales” and 
through geographies that gradually become interconnected.24 This tran-
scending violence requires a different ontology, an ontology that outdoes 
individuals and enables us to behold the world from another perspective: 
not that of its future, but that of its end. Indeed, as Tim Morton notably 
insinuates, the world’s end— the end of the way we are used to behold- 
ing our world— is already here, already now. And this apocalypse— this 
revelation— is the Anthropocene. In our postgeological age, objects finally 
reveal themselves for what they are: not things individualized in the here- 
and- now but processes and substances spread in quagmires of space- 
time- matter that merge with our existences: hyperobjects. How otherwise 
could one picture “things that are massively distributed in time and space 
relative to humans” such as the biosphere, global warming, “the sum total 
of all the nuclear materials on Earth,” or simply a polystyrene cup?25 
Hyperobjects reside in this permanent interference across individuals; 
they are not punctual but radial and viscous. Not only, then, do they 
falsify “the idea that time and space are empty containers that entities sit 
in”26 but, as blind outcomes of human causality, they are directly respon-
sible for the end of the world— of the world in which we used to see space 
and time as linearly interrelated. They— really— are “unorganizable.”
In this world of hyperobjects, in which our moral imagination is chal-
lenged by the impotence of God and the vulnerability of creation, we 
have to start seeing our life as a hyperobject itself. We are ourselves a 
Cohen-Duckert.indd   323 13/07/2017   10:46:11 PM
324 Serenella Iovino
wider being— a “we” that is immanent in the human and yet transcends 
it: we are “life looking back,” Clarice would say. It is across and within 
the body of this huge hyperobject that the slow violence of irresponsible 
practices takes place. Because, in the Tzimtzum- world, “both creation 
and destruction are always on the horizon.”27
So, at the end of all these stories— of roaches and chemistry, of human 
freedom and divine restraint— what is the lesson? Maybe this one: that 
we need to swerve our gaze and respond to the world’s calling faces, 
even if this means the risk to lose (or loosen) our human uniqueness. 
And we need a mystical stance to let things and beings reveal themselves 
to us. Away from the solitude of the I/eye and from the abstraction of 
isolated singularities, behold is an invitation to reenchant the world by 
holding together the entangled, luminous fragility of all beings. Hyper-
objects, slow violence, and all the invisible bonds that make us one with 
everything in space and in time, coiling together immanence and tran-
scendence as in a Möbius strip, forcing us to veer from our usual paths 
to embrace the swirling pace of our worldly sacredness: this is what we 
must behold. So, behold this veering world, now. Yes, behold: this— is— 
a— veering— call.
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